Borrowers who do not repay in a timely fashion face accruing interest, which is usually capitalized, increasing the amount of debt principal. Some recent research suggests that student loan debt is the most significant factor holding back millions of Americans who have either zero or negative net worth (Armantier, Armona, De Giorgi, and van der Klaauw 2016) . For many families, student loans are still the only financial tool available to bridge the gap between college costs and funds from family savings and other sources of aid, such as scholarships and grants.
However, some students and families may be reluctant to borrow for college because of the uncertainty over job prospects and the repayment burden associated with the debt; thereby keeping some potentially highly successful students out of the higher education system.
In light of these concerns, considerable political attention has been focused on providing financial relief to student loan debtors, resulting in a number of programs that extend repayment terms, graduate payments, or tie required payments to discretionary income. The aim of student debt relief programs is quite clear: to provide a safety net for distressed borrowers, in the process reducing the likelihood of delinquency and default, and possibly diffuse the fear of debt for reluctant, promising borrowers. But, the costs and outcomes for participating borrowers are not clear. The consequences of the numerous IDR and other relief programs, such as extended and graduated repayment, for the federal budget is even less clear. This paper seeks to contribute to the policy discussions on student loan debt relief by analyzing borrowers' repayment obligations and likely outcomes under alternative repayment programs and estimating the associated fiscal implications for the federal government. We focus on income-driven repayment plans administered through the Department of Education. The federal government also operates some loan forgiveness and debt relief programs outside the Department of Education, but these loans are comparatively very small in the number of recipients and in aggregate disbursements. 5 There are substantial variations in earnings prospects and other labor market conditions for borrowers. Without IDR programs, the risks are largely shouldered by borrowers because lenders are protected from most consequences of unpaid debt (including when the federal government is the direct lender). The projected cash recovery rate for defaulting Stafford loans is 105.4 percent, meaning that the collection of principal, interest, and penalty fees would more than offset the dollars that were defaulted (U.S. Department of Education, 2015) . This number has led many to believe (erroneously) that the federal government benefits when borrowers default on their student loans (Field, 2011) . The cash recovery rate does not reflect collection costs paid to collection agencies or the time value of money. The net present value of principal, interest, and fees collected, net of collection costs that are paid to collection agencies, yields a recovery rate of 81.8 percent, which, nonetheless, is exceptional for defaulted debt.
Federal Student Loan Debt Relief Programs
Student loan debt has increased dramatically over the last several years, from about $346 billion in the fourth quarter of 2004 to $1.26 trillion the end of the first quarter of 2016. 6 At the end of the first quarter of 2016, about 43 million, or one in six of 258 million consumers with credit reports had student loan debt. 7 The average balance for those with student debt was 5 In calendar year 2014, the latest date at which data are available, student loans outside of the Department of Education were offered by 33 agencies to 8,469 students at a total cost of $58.7 million. By contrast, $28,377, and the median was $15,300. The median is significantly lower than the average because the distribution of student loan debt is heavily skewed due to a small share of very-highbalance borrowers. About 15.5 percent of borrowers have student debt in excess of $50,000, and 4.7 percent have student debt above $100,000. Although borrowers with loan balances in excess of $200,000 account for only one percent of all student loan debtors, the share has doubled from 0.5 percent since the first quarter of 2014.
By default, both the Direct Loan and FFEL programs put borrowers into a standard repayment plan, which is characterized by fully amortized, fixed, level payments for 10 years.
Currently about 54 percent of student loan debtors in repayment are in this standard plan ( Figure   1 ; see also Edmiston, 2016) . There are other programs for student loan borrowers to consider when repayment becomes a challenge.
Non-Income-Driven Repayment Plans
Borrowers who have difficulty repaying their loans can apply for deferment or forbearance, both of which eliminate required payments for a fixed period of time, ostensibly to avoid default. Interest usually accrues during both deferment and forbearance, except for deferment of a subsidized loan. 8 Currently 11 percent of outstanding student loan debt is in forbearance and another 11 percent is deferred (Edmiston, 2016) . Only 51 percent of student debt is in repayment.
Another option is to extend the repayment term, which reduces the monthly payment but increases the aggregate cost. Many borrowers have multiple federal loans with different terms and repayment periods. They can consolidate these loans and make a single monthly payment.
identifying information is removed from individual credit reports. Consumers are linked overtime by an ID that is a scramble of their Social Security numbers. 8 https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/deferment-forbearance.
For Direct Consolidation loans, the repayment period can be extended up to 30 years, depending on the loan amount. More generally, borrowers who have more than $30,000 in outstanding federal loans originated after October 7, 1998 have the opportunity to extend their repayment plan to 25 years.
Borrowers with low initial income but higher expected income in the future (such as physicians) may benefit from the Graduated Repayment Plan. Payments are low at the beginning of the repayment term and increase over time, usually every two years, so that the principal is fully paid at the end of the repayment term (typically 10 years or 25 years). Graduated
Repayment schedules cannot negatively amortize and the payment due cannot exceed three times of payment under any other program. The specific repayment schedules differ across individuals depending on the number of years in the repayment plan and the rate of graduation.
Income-Driven Repayment Plans
Student loan debtors increasingly have turned to repayment programs that limit the required payment to a formulaic amount determined largely by student debt and income, but also additional factors, such as type of loan (for example, subsidized or not subsidized) and family structure (marital status and dependents). Income-driven repayment plans (IDR plans) include Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR), Income-Based Repayment (IBR), Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE), and the Revised PAYE (REPAYE) ( Table 1) .
Most borrowers are eligible for one or more IDR plans, but currently only 25 percent of borrowers in repayment take advantage of the programs (Figure 1 ; see also Edmiston, 2016 ). An additional, potentially very lucrative (for borrowers) benefit of IDR plans is that at the end of the repayment term (typically 10, 20, or 25 years), any remaining debt, including unpaid interest, usually is forgiven. Eligibility, payment amount, interest benefits, repayment period, and amount forgiven at the end of repayment period vary by plan, amount of student debt, date of origination, income, and family size. Because the monthly payments for IDR plans are based on the difference between a borrower's income and some multiple of the poverty threshold, the monthly payment can be zero for some borrowers. The remainder of the section details these programs. Federal Register, vol. 80, no. 210, pp. 67204-67242, October 15, 2015 . Addition changes include that the REPAYE allows the monthly payments to be higher than those under a standard plan, different treatment of married couples' income PAYE plan, and different interest benefits. 10 Graduate and professional students likely will opt for PAYE over REPAYE because the latter has "harsh" spousal income inclusion rules (Crespi, 2016) .
Status, borrowers typically submit their previous year's tax return to verify their income, marital status, and number of dependents. (income, dependents, etc., usually through the submission of the previous year's tax return) or voluntarily leave the plans.
Forgiveness. After making the required number of payments under an IDR plan, any remaining debt is forgiven. In a number of cases in our simulations, the entire amount of principal is forgiven. Moreover, unless a capitalization event occurs, unpaid interest is forgiven as well. In some cases, this unpaid interest can be nearly as high as the unpaid principal. In other cases, however, principal is completely paid by the debtor in an IDR plan, typically before the end of the repayment term.
The Public to certify qualification for PSLF, which has provides more certainty to both borrower and federal government. 11 Another critical issue affecting PSLF costs is that the program arguably favors those with the largest debts (Delisle, 2016) . Of those who have enrolled in the program (which is optional), 80 percent have student debt exceeding the maximum allowed for dependent undergraduates, suggesting that the program heavily favors those who attended graduate or professional degree programs.
Program Take-Up. The Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2015) estimates that the majority of borrowers of federal student loans are qualified for an IDR plan. But, as noted above, only 25 percent of borrowers in repayment currently are taking advantage of an IDR plan.
The take-up rate of these programs depends largely on borrowers' understanding of the programs (GAO, 2015) .
In recent years, federal agencies, institutions, and counselors have made efforts to raise awareness of these programs. The Department of Education emails borrowers with a balance higher than $25,000 and/or who have missed payments information about repayment plans. The
Congressional Budget Office reports increasing take-up rates. Figure 1 shows the share of borrowers who participated in various student debt relief programs in the second quarter of 2016.
About one-fourth of the student-loan borrowers were enrolled in an IDR plan at that time.
Analysis of Borrower and Fiscal Impacts
In this section, we use simulations to evaluate how the IBR, PAYE, and REPAYE programs affect borrowers and the federal budget (fiscal impact) under a number of alternative income-debt scenarios when entering repayment. The income basis for IDRs is adjusted gross income (AGI, as defined by the IRS). Given our assumptions about the borrower in our simulations, described below, AGI would rarely differ from gross income. In our simulations, income ranges from $25,000 to $50,000, while initial student debt load ranges between $20,000
and $100,000. We believe that the scenarios we examine cover the large bulk of people with outstanding student loan debt entering a repayment program. About 30 percent of outstanding student loan debtors owe between $25,000 and $100,000, new graduates in 2015 were expected to average over $37,000 in student debt (Kantrowitz, 2014) . More importantly, student loan borrowers with low levels of debt are unlikely to meet the requirements for the IDR plans because their payments under the default program would not be higher than under the IDR plans.
They would not benefit by enrolling in an IDR plan. Those who have very low incomes along with low debt, say due to job loss, would likely be better off with a hardship forbearance than a long-term IDR plan and would be expected to take that route.
Currently, independent the Department of Education limits undergraduate students to $57,500 in accumulated debt, while those who use student loans to finance graduate school are limited to $138,500, inclusive of any undergraduate borrowing (medical school and health professions student can borrow up to $224,000 in total). 12 However, these principal balances could potentially grow significantly with capitalized interest in forbearance, or in the case of deferment, capitalized interest on unsubsidized loans.
Consider an undergraduate who attends college over 5-years, borrows the maximum $24,500 in subsidized loans and the maximum $33,000 in unsubsidized loans, for an aggregate of $57,500 (borrowing is limited to the cost of attendance less other financial aid; see U.S. Year 2016 Year -2017 . Interest (at an assumed 6 percent) would accumulate on the unsubsidized loans during school, and in the 6-month grace period that follows, assuming no interest payments are made during the loan period. The subsidized amount would remain $24,500, but the unsubsidized amount, following interest capitalization, will have grown from $33,000 to $59,721, and total student loan debt when entering repayment would be $84,221.
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All graduate student loans are unsubsidized, so a student borrowing the maximum would be expected to leave school with a much higher balance if not paying accruing interest while in deferment. Further, graduate students may borrow additional amounts from the graduate PLUS program with no limits other than the cost of attendance. For some programs, particularly those leading to professional degrees, the cost of attendance can be extraordinarily high, and graduates often enter their careers (and repayment) with very large student debt loads. About 80 percent of medical students (pursuing an MD) graduate with over $100,000 in student debt, and almost twothirds graduate with more than $150,000 in education debt. The median is about $175,000 (AMA Insurance, 2014).
Payments and outcomes of IDRs depend not only on income and debt, but also marital status, number of dependents (as defined by the IRS), the interest rate on the student debt, the rate used to discount payments to calculate the net present value (NPV), the growth rate of income, and the rate of growth in the poverty threshold. To proceed with our analysis, we must make assumptions about these factors. Later in the paper we test the sensitivity of the results to these assumptions. First, we assume that the borrower entering a repayment program is single and has no dependents. We believe that this assumption reflects the modal family structure of those entering repayment, if not the majority (Nau et al., 2014; Anderson, 2013) . We assume that interest rate charged on student debt is 6 percent, based on the average in the Department of Education student loan portfolio (authors' calculation). 14 In calculating discretionary income over time, we assume that income grows at 3.4 percent annually, which is the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in employee compensation between 2000 and 2015. 15 We assume the poverty threshold grows at a CAGR of 2.14 percent, based on the annualized rate of increase for a one-person household between 2000 and 2016. 16 We assume that the future stream of student loan payments is discounted at the same rate as investment grade U.S. corporate bonds (S&P Dow Jones Index, U.S. Corporate Bonds, U.S. Investment Grade Bonds), which was approximately 2.8 percent at time of analysis.
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Our most critical assumption is that the debt is paid as agreed. Currently, 82 percent of outstanding student loans in the Department of Education portfolio and in repayment are being paid as agreed. We feel it important to get a firm grasp on how these programs work as designed, which is a necessary foundation for any additional analyses, including the effects of delinquency and default. Indeed, the impetus behind IDRs was an expected decline in delinquencies and defaults, and early results bear that out (GAO, 2015) . Finally, we feel that focusing on the structure of student loan repayment programs is critical in making informed policy decisions.
14 Data sources include interest rates enumerated at https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/interest-rates and ED portfolio composition from The National Student Loan Data System / ED. Under the FCRA, expected repayments are discounted to present value using the U.S. Treasury's borrowing rates, and thus, at that risk-free rate, they do not reflect the risk that default rates could be higher than projected
Budget Process for the Federal Student Loan Program
The net costs of student loan programs are recorded in the federal budget on an accrual basis in the year the loan is disbursed (see Edmiston, 2012) . The cost is calculated as the net present value of the federal government's expected cash flow over the life of the loan (or loan guarantee) less the amount disbursed. 18 We follow the same procedure in our simulations. These estimates do not account for the costs of administering the programs, such as those associated with origination, servicing, and collection, which are treated separately in the federal budget on a cash basis. 19 In the 2017 Federal Budget Request, administrative costs were about 1.4 percent of disbursements (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2016).
Methodology
We evaluate the outcomes of student loan debt relief programs with simulations.
Specifically, for 25 combinations of income and debt when entering repayment, we use each IDR program's criteria to develop a repayment schedule. That is, we compute the required payment for each month over the repayment term. In the PAYE and REPAYE cases, these are 240 monthly payments (unless the balance is paid before 20 years), while for IBR, we compute up to 300 payments.
Each payment made during the repayment term must be calculated and appropriately discounted. Thus, critical for an analysis of fiscal impact is the calculation of a repayment 18 The CBO budget calculations do account for the risk of default or exercise of options to prepay or to seek forbearance or deferment. The cost estimates under the former FFEL program also account for payments to lenders. The CBO uses annual ED data to update default rates for the outstanding loan portfolio to make allowances in the current budget for any difference in expected costs to the federal government. 19 Recent federal budget estimates project a negative net cost for the Direct Loan program. While federal budget numbers suggest that the federal government "profits" from the student loan program, more widely accepted accounting methodologies, specifically fair value, reflect a net cost. PAYE and REPAYE typically yield nearly the same results in any kind of analysis, as seen in the simulations below. REPAYE was conceived as an extension of PAYE to a larger pool of debtors, and the income-driven payment calculation is identical. While there are some significant differences between the programs (like the PFH requirement for PAYE and rules on capitalization of unpaid interest), these differences usually result in significantly different outcomes only under special circumstances. This issue is discussed further below.
In the specific case considered here, payments and total amount paid (area under the curve) are lowest under PAYE/REPAYE, and thus one of these programs would clearly be the best choice among IDR programs for this candidate. However, PAYE or REPAYE may not be the best options for others, depending on their individual circumstances (participation in IBR remains relatively high). Indeed, PAYE or REPAYE may not be the best solutions even in this specific case under certain circumstances, such as exit from the program. Finally, if forgiven debt and interest are taxable at the end of the repayment period, PAYE and REPAYE could be considerably more costly to the debtor. Combined forgiveness of principal and unpaid interest would likely be about $60,000 under both programs. Forgiveness is discussed in more detail later in the paper. Tax implications are briefly discussed later in the paper but are not considered in detail because it is outside the scope of our analysis. Of course, many borrowers entering repayment do not qualify for an IDR plan or for only some plans.
An important factor in the NPVs we calculate is the capitalization of unpaid interest.
Unpaid interest (typically arising from negative amortization) is treated differently across IDR programs. Under IBR and PAYE, a "capitalizing event" includes the loss of PFH status. Unpaid interest is capitalized at that point, and that is how capitalization is treated in our simulations.
Under ICR, IBR, PAYE, and REPAYE, exit from the program is a "capitalizing event." In our simulations, we assume that the hypothetical debtor does not exit the program. We do track unpaid interest, however, which gives an upper bound of the amount of capitalization that is possible under each program if one were to exit.
Under IBR, PAYE, and REPAYE, unpaid interest is fully subsidized during the first three years of repayment if the loan is a subsidized loan; however, in our simulations we assume debt is unsubsidized. REPAYE subsidizes unpaid interest by 50 percent throughout the program even if the debt is made up of unsubsidized loans. PAYE limits interest capitalization to 10 percent of the debt when entering repayment.
Simulation Results
For each IDR and income-debt combination, we compute total payments (decomposed into interest, capitalized interest, and principal), the upper bound for capitalized interest, the amount of forgiveness of loan principal and unpaid interest, and the NPV to the ED (or fiscal impact) ( Table 2 ). The simulations abstract from delinquencies, tax implications, and program exits.
Fiscal Impact. As outlined above, the fiscal impact is the present value of the future stream of repayments less the disbursed amount, or the NPV. For exposition, we discuss two scenarios in some detail. We then summarize all of the simulations in a series of charts that highlight the variation in fiscal impact across scenarios.
To demonstrate, consider the first scenario in the table, where a borrower enters the IBR program with $25,000 in income and $20,000 in student debt. Payments over the repayment term sum to $36,290 (Table 2) Consider first the IBR program (Figure 3 ). The greatest fiscal gain is derived from the participant with $50,000 in income and $100,000 in student debt, resulting in a fiscal gain of $41,777. About 4.5 percent of consumers with student loan debt have outstanding student loan debt in excess of $100,000 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2016) . The most expensive participant from a fiscal impact perspective has $25,000 in income and $100,000 in debt, resulting in a fiscal cost of $60,059. Under PAYE and REPAYE, the highest-cost participant is also the one with $25,000 in income and $100,000 in debt, both resulting in fiscal costs of about $80,000. Also under both PAYE and REPAYE, the participant with $50,000 in both student debt and income yields the greatest fiscal gain-about $17,000 in both cases. It is important to note that the forgiveness of principal and unpaid interest is not a real cost to the government and does not enter into fiscal impact calculations. The fiscal impact is determined by the discounted stream of repayments and the disbursement amount. The fiscal impact of forgiveness is zero. Rather, forgiven balances represent "paper losses" in the sense that the ED is "leaving money on the table." Forgiveness is critically important in the incentives for acquiring student debt, however. In particular, the combination of income-driven repayment and forgiveness of principal and unpaid interest creates a severe moral hazard.
Moral Hazard. Krugman (2009) suggests that moral hazard occurs when the person deciding on the amount of risk to bear (the student loan borrower) is not the person who pays if "things go badly" (taxpayers) (p. 63). This definition is particularly appropriate for the moral hazard inherent in IDR programs. Looking through Table 2 , which provides complete results from the simulations, the moral hazard is quite striking and obvious.
Under all of the IDRs, a threshold is reached at which a student can borrow more at no cost to himself but at potentially substantial fiscal cost. For example, consider a borrower who expects to have income of $25,000 after completing school and entering repayment. If he accumulates $20,000 in student debt, his payout over the repayment term in, say, REPAYE, would be $27,459. Because his payments are based entirely on discretionary income, his payment would remain $27,459 for any level of borrowing above $20,000. While there are limits on borrowing-a maximum at the undergraduate level and cost of attendance at the undergraduate and graduate levels-the accumulation of large amounts of student debt is not at all uncommon. While this hypothetical student bears no additional cost if he borrows more, the fiscal cost is substantially higher. In our simulations, at $20,000 of student debt, the fiscal cost is $32. At $30,000 it is $10,032. At $75,000, it is $55,032.
Moral hazard is not limited to low levels of income on entering repayment. At $50,000 in income, the debtor would pay $99,661 whether borrowing $75,000 or $100,000. In these cases, the fiscal cost is $1,511 and $26,511, respectively. The difference is the $25,000 in additional borrowing.
Sensitivity Analysis
The methodology section above noted a number of assumptions that were required in order to undertake the simulations we use to evaluate borrower and fiscal outcomes of IDR programs.
While we use what we think are the best assumptions given current economic data and research, we recognize that our results are sensitive to these assumptions-some more than others. To gauge the sensitivity of our results to assumptions, we consider a single case: an individual in the REPAYE programs with income of $35,000 and debt of $30,000. We consider specifically the sensitivity of fiscal impact to the assumptions. The results of the analysis are provided in Figure 7 .
The fiscal impact changes with a change in any of the assumptions, but they are not qualitatively different-for example, positives do not become negatives. The fiscal impact is highly sensitive to the rate of interest on student loan debt, which is not surprising given that interest has priority over principal, and in many cases, only interest is paid. While different assumptions about income growth affect the fiscal outcome, the effect does not appear to be as strong as changes in assumptions of student loan interest. Comparatively, this result is sensible because only a fraction of income is considered in calculating payments. Finally the discount rate can significantly alter the NPV, as would be expected. However, the impact should be proportional to the discount rate, which would not change the results of our simulations at all except for a scalar multiplier.
Related Issues
Tax Implications
A detailed discussion of the tax implications of the cancellation of debt and unpaid interest is outside the scope of our paper, they can be substantial and potentially create significant financial hardship. Under current law, debt forgiveness is taxable in the year it is cancelled except under circumstances where the debt is forgiven for participation in certain specified professions, such as under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program. Debt cancelled because of closed schools (e.g., Corinthian College) also are not generally taxable. If an individual were to have $100,000 of debt and unpaid interest cancelled and faces a marginal income tax rate of 28 percent, the cancellation would obviously result in a tax cost of $28,000 in the year the debt is cancelled, which would be a huge tax bite for most people, but especially for lower-income borrowers who are the most likely to benefit from IDR programs.
An indirect but critically important tax implication of the student loan program is the effect of the generally higher incomes that come with higher education on federal, state, and local tax collections. That is, these higher earnings generally translate into higher tax contributions. Further, college graduates typically impose less cost on the government from public assistance, crime, and other sources. On the other hand, at least a portion of student loan interest is deductible on personal income tax returns for most borrowers in repayment.
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Delinquency and Default
About 16.3 percent of student loan borrowers and 11.3 percent of student loan debt were in any stage of delinquency (late in payment) at the end of first quarter of 2016 according to our calculations using the CCP/Equifax. These numbers include borrowers who are not in active repayment. The average and median balances for delinquent borrowers were $25,193 and $12,423 respectively, lower than the amounts when considering all borrowers. The average and median delinquent balances were $19,664 and $10,436, respectively, implying that some borrowers were delinquent on some student loans but current on others.
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While a consideration of delinquency and default is outside the scope of this paper in that our goal is to lay out the mechanics of IDR programs and estimate outcomes when these programs are working as intended, we recognize that delinquencies and defaults are critically important in evaluating the fiscal impact of IDR programs. As noted earlier, a reduction in defaults was a driving force in conceptualizing IDR programs, and our expectation is that defaults are and will be much lower for those in IDRs, all else equal. Indeed, research using early data from these IDRs shows lower default rates (GAO, 2015) . Missed or late payments under an IDR plan extend the repayment period for the purposes of forgiveness of unpaid principal and interest (e.g., one late payment extends the repayment period by one month). Implications of default are more serious because payments made on a defaulted loan do not count towards forgiveness. Default also may lead to interest capitalization and program exit. Unfortunately little accessible data are available on the default rates across payment programs. Future research needs to take into account of how defaults and delinquencies in these IDR plans can affect the costs to the federal government.
Conclusion
Student loans make higher education possible for many individuals who otherwise may not be able to pursue higher education. There is a considerable body of research on the returns to higher education that almost uniformly supports the notion that higher education yields private benefits that are worth the cost, however financed, but also social benefits (see survey in
Toutkoushian and Paulsen, 2016). Baum, Ma and Payea (2014) estimate that the median lifetime earnings for those with a bachelor's degree are more than two thirds higher than those with only a high school diploma.
The myriad of student loan repayment plans often is bewildering for borrowers. An important goal of this paper is to bring clarity to the repayment "system" by comparing and contrasting alternative programs. We then turn to an analysis of borrower outcomes and fiscal impact.
Using simulations under a large number of income and debt scenarios, we find that the fiscal implications can vary significantly depending on income and debt load of the borrowers and the relief program chosen. The computations of fiscal impact show that fiscal costs are especially high for borrowers with low incomes and high debts. A natural policy question arising from this analysis is whether the fiscal cost of IDRs for this cohort and fiscal gains from higherincome, high-debt borrowers could be used in a way that would serve the purpose of the student loan program but at less cost and risk to the neediest borrowers.
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The simulations uncover a moral hazard that is a significant concern given its costs.
While we are not aware of any general tendency to over-borrow, we believe most economists would argue that a good program should not have these kinds of incentives that come at such great cost to taxpayers.
Recent policy debates on student loan debt have increasingly focused on efforts to relieve debtors of burdensome payments. These efforts, as embodied in IDR plans, are largely successful in making student loan repayment more manageable for borrowers, but there are many unknowns. The implementation of IDR plans, which have become increasingly debtor-friendly, shifts a significant share of risk (say, from uncertain labor market outcomes) from borrowers to taxpayers. Source: Authors' calculations; Image created with XLSTAT-3D Plot Note: Simulated forgiveness of principal and interest is higher the higher is the bubble on the z-axis (forgiveness). In this case, forgiveness is highest when income is $25,000, the lowest value on y-axis (income) and debt is $100,000, the highest value on the x-axis (initial debt). Note: The first column refers to the scenario with the baseline assumptions: income (AGI) grows at 3.4%, student loan interest rate at 6% and discount rate at 2.8% annually. 
